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Abstract
This paper develops on a Solow type of model where the gov-
ernment is introduced as a decision maker. Additionally, this paper
introduces consumer decisions and assumes that individuals can be
diﬀerentiated by their relative factor endowment (labor and private
capital). The results indicate that the economy’s growth rate has an
inverted U-shape relationship with the tax rate on private capital τ.
They also indicate that the tax rate has a positive relation with the
amount of money government spend on consumption, θ, (rather than
on investment in public capital). The paper also concludes that the
choice of the tax rate will be above the optimal level and hence the
potential growth rate will not be achieved. Taking the analysis fur-
ther, it can be assumed that voters will try to correct lower tax rates
of public investment by choosing an higher tax rate. This tax rate will
be higher if society is more disparate in terms of income distribution.
However, by reducing θ, τ automatically decreases thus bringing us
closer to the optimum.
Finally, the conclusion from a public policy perspective is that
there is a negative relationship between the chosen tax rate and public
investment and that this relationship is highly sensitive to the model
parameters.
JEL: A, H, O11, O43
Keywords: growth, income distribution, government budget, gov-
ernment eﬃciency
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent literature there are several papers that approach issues related
to the eﬀects of income distribution in economy (for example [1] or [32]).
Other papers relate income distribution and policy but usually address the
problem in the reverse perspective: how does policy aﬀect income distribution
and poorness ([17], [19]). Some literature focus on the relationship between
distribution and economic performance. In [27] reference is made to the
speciﬁc channels through which income distribution aﬀects growth1.T h e r ei s
also research that deals with the speciﬁc relation between income distribution
and education in an empirical perspective (see [14]) or in a more theoretical
framework (see [13]). Income equality and economic performance are clearly
important subjects in the literature (even though it is not a recent subject,
see for example [18]).
There are several papers that link income inequality and economic growth.
In [29] the authors ﬁnd evidence that there is a negative association between
income inequality and growth. The authors state that due to income in-
equality the political deciders produce policies that tax activities that could
promote growth (namely investment). Additionally in [7] the authors show
that the growth rate falls with the gap between rich and poor. The paper [1]
also addresses the issue of the relationship between income distribution and
economic growth. In this paper the authors develop a model of endogenous
growth where the government has a constructive role in the sense that they
provide a productive good. The consumers distinguish themselves through
the relative endowment of labor and capital. Individuals will chose the tax
rate on capital. Applying the median voter theorem the authors conclude
that the more unequal the income distribution is the further will the tax rate
be from the tax rate that maximizes growth. So there is a negative relation
between income inequality and slow growth. Our paper goes a step further
1In the cited paper the authors conclude that there is a strong link between income
distribution and social/political instability and income distirbution and education/fertility
decisions. They conclude that there is less support of the link between income distirbution
and ﬁscal policy.
1and tries to see if governments can, via public investment in public capital,
interfere in this relation by reducing the tax rate that maximizes the utility
of the median voter.
There is a relatively extensive literature concerning the importance of gov-
ernment investment, the composition of public expenditures and growth2.I n
[17] the authors claim that ”Governments can accelerate economic develop-
ment through their decisions on public expenditures” a conclusion supported
by the authors in [31]. In [4] the authors look for the relationship between
public capital and economic growth by trying to ﬁnd the ratio of public to
private capital that maximizes growth. They argue that the decrease in this
ratio in the late years in the United States is probably responsible for the low
rate of productivity growth3. The link between public capital and private
factors productivity is also addressed, in an empirical perspective, by [15]
and restated by [12] and [2]. In [31] the authors survey the link between
public investment and economic growth and ﬁnd evidence in the literature
that there is a growing consensus that public capital represents ”the wheels
- if not the engine - of economic activity”. This idea is reinforced by the
position of the authors in [3] by claiming the importance of the quantity of
public capital required for economic growth. Our model (that is based on
the one presented in [1]) is an extension of the model presented in [26] and
ﬁt si nt h el i t e r a t u r eo fe n d o g e n o u sg r o w t hm o d e l ss u c ha s[ 6 ]a n d[ 5 ] .
Our starting point is that empirically t h e r ei ss o m ee v i d e n c eo far e l a t i o n
between income distribution government quality and government size. In [25]
several measures of government eﬃciency are built by constructing the ratio
b e t w e e nt h eo u t p u to fag i v e ns e c t o r( f o re x a m p l ed r o po u tr a t ei nt h ec a s e
of education or infant mortality rate in the case of the health department)
and the amount of money governments spend in that precise sector. Using
one of these ratios (Mortality rate infant/Public health expenditures) and
the gini index we constructed a chart (Appendix A) that gives us an idea of
the positive relation between income inequality and government ineﬃciency
(the higher the gini index is the higher our ratio is, i.e., the less eﬃcient
2This literature follows closely [5]. See also [31] for a critical survey on public capital
and economic growth.
3This conclusion is also referred by [2] where the authors establish a link between
underinvestment in public capital and low productivty growth.
2governments are). Using general government expenditures as a measure of
government size we can also plot government size against income inequality
(Appendix A). We can broadly conclude that there is a negative relation
between government size and income inequality4.
We can say that the paper is linked with two streams of literature: income
distribution and growth and public investment and growth trying to bridge
the two. In the next section we present a model of endogenous growth where
we have the government as a decision maker. The government has to decide,
after the voters choose the level of the tax rate on capital, how much resources
should be devoted to public consumption and how many resources should be
spent on investment in public capital, which in the line with [26] allows the
government to produce quality. The link between quality and growth has
been addressed in the literature (see for example [11], [21], [20] or [9]) .
The consumers have diﬀerent capital endowments and have to vote on the
tax rate. There is a single good in the economy which is produced using
private capital and the consumption good and the capital good produced
by the government. In section three we solve the decentralized problem
of maximizing the utility and ﬁnd out the steady state growth rate and
the tax rate that maximizes it. In section four we analyse the solution if
the government was to choose the tax rate that maximizes the utility of
consumer i. W et h e ns e ew h a tw i l lt h ep o l i c yc h o i c eb eu n d e rm a j o r i t y
voting and according with the median voter theorem. We analyze how the
government intervention will reduce the majority choice of the tax rate and
do some sensitivity analysis to the parameters in the model. In section six
we conclude.
2T h e M o d e l
The model presented has some close similarities with [26]. The deﬁnition of
the production function and of the government uses for the tax revenues are
basically the same. One ﬁrst diﬀerence has to do with the tax base. In [26]
the tax is on income. In the present paper we introduce the consumer side
4The data used for both charts is from World Development Indicators 2002.
3and we distinguish consumers based on their relative factor ownership. In
this case the tax is on private capital.
Consider an economy where output is linear in capital and public services
























To ﬁnance spending on public services, the government uses a distor-
tionary tax on private capital income, τ. The budget is balanced every
instant so: gt = τkpt.
There are two uses of tax revenues, according to:
Ht = θτKpt (4)
.







We can se that Ht is basically a consumption good in the sense that
governments spend a given percentage, θ, to deliver Ht.
The idea behind government quality, qt,i st h a tf o rag o v e r n m e n tt ob e
eﬃcient it needs to accumulate, i.e., eﬃciency or quality take time to build.
we do not assume a linear relation between quality and per capita capital
because we want to introduce the idea of saturation, i.e., governments can ac-
cumulate capital that allows them to be more eﬃcient but this accumulation
becomes less and less productive. In [25] there was empirical evidence that
in fact there was a positive and strong relation between public capital and
government eﬃciency. The results where quite striking and robust once they
4survive the inclusion of control variables such has GDP or even government
spending.
Rewriting the partial derivatives assuming that labor is supplied inelas-










































Where r(τ,θ)i sAα(θτ)β and w(τ,θ)i sA(1 − α)(θτ)β both expressions
depend on technological parameters (A, α and β) and on government choices
(through θ and τ). r(τ,θ) is a positive function of all the parameters while
w(τ,θ) is a negative function of α (and a positive function of all the other
parameters). Both marginal productivites are positive functions of the tax
rate and of θ. They also depend positively on public capital. The wage rate
is also increasing in the private capital stock and assuming that α + β < 1
the rate of return on private capital depends negatively on private capital.




























where Li is the labor endowment of individual i.
5For the national income identity to be satisﬁed, it is necessary that:































gt = y c.q.d..
52.1 Individual Income and Inequality
We consider an economy where if σ is high the individual is capital poor and
if σ is low than individual i is capital rich. In a perfect egalitarian society we
would have σi =1∀i, since everybody would have the exact same amount











































3.1 Individual Maximization for given τ and θ
We assume that all individuals have the same utility function. Consumers






































































































This relation reports us to the familiar facts that marginal utility of con-
sumption equals marginal utility of income and that marginal utility of con-























gt − τ − ρ (20)
This equation says that households choose consumption as to equal the
rate of return on capital to the rate of time preference, plus the tax rate plus
the rate of decrease of the marginal utility of consumption.











gt − τ − ρ = γ (21)
Which as we know tells us that the growth rate of consumption equals
the rate of return net of time discount and taxes.





































Proposition 1 If we assume constant returns6 to scale on private and public



































































































What we have is that the private capital growth rate is independent of
any individual characteristics and it is independent of the individual factor
6Note that we have to assume that 1 − α − β > 0 otherwise one of the growth rates
would be negative. Under constant or diminuishing returns this assumption is guaranteed:
Constant or diminuishing returns would imply: α+β+ψβ ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ α+β ≤ 1−ψβ =⇒
α + β < 1.
7Appendix B
8endowment. This allows us to conclude that the growth rate of individual












This last equation assures us that the identity of the median voter will





























gt − τ − ρ = γ (31)
To assure that we are in a balanced growth path we must impose constant
returns to scale, this follows directly from (24) and (4)
.













∂t =0a n dw e










































ψβ =1 − α − β ⇐⇒ (38)






















gt − τ − ρ = γ
93.2 Government Choice of τ
Now instead of considering τ and θ constants we are interested in seeing what
happens to the economy (in particular to the growth rate) if we vary each of
them at a time. To see the eﬀect of variations in τ and θ in the growth rate we
ﬁrst have to see what happens to kpt and kgt when these parameters change.
If we consider kp0 and kg0 to be, respectively, the stock of private capital and





























































− 1 = 0 (46)
10Remember that we must have constant returns to scale which means that:



























































We can see that, given kpt and kgt the growth rate has an inverted U-shape
relation with τ8.
So we have a tax rate that maximizes the economy’s growth rate and
that has a positive monotonous relation with kgt and with θ and a negative
monotonous relation with kpt.










It is easy to see that the growth rate has a monotonous positive relation
with θ.




































We are now interested in seeing what is the individual i0s preferred policy in
what concerns τ and θ. We are going to address this issue by seeing what
would the tax rate and θ be if the government was interested in maximizing
individual i0s well being or we can think of it as a centralized problem where
individual i makes the decisions.
Lets ﬁrst see what is the instantaneous level of consumption along the
optimal path.









gt − τ − ρ)k
i
pt (53)
































































Individual i consumes the entire labor income plus a fraction of his capital
stock.
































kpt = γkpt (60)
12As in [1] the constrains make clear that the choices of policy aﬀect both
the level of consumption and its growth rate. The last restriction is necessary
because kpt enters the deﬁnition of σi.

















pt + μ2γkpt (61)





























































9We are going to ignore the partial derivatives of kpt and kgt with respect to τ or θ















π, we are left with an expression that gives us, implicitly, the optimal tax

















´ α + β
β
+









=( α + β)ρ (67)
The expression on the left side of the above equation (lets call it expression
A) is an increasing function of τ while the expression on the right side is a
constant, we can easily see that this implies an unique solution for τi (see
ﬁgure 1).
Figure 1
































i(α + β)ρ (68)
Setting σi = 0 we are in the case of an individual that is pure capitalist













In Appendix C equation [C22] we can see that expression A is decreasing
in σi.S oi fσ0 < σ1 we will have A0 >A 1 and this will imply that τ0 < τ1
(see ﬁgure 2)
Figure 2
What we have is that the bigger σi is the higher will be the tax rate that
maximizes individual i0s utility.
The exact same reasoning can be applied to θ and we can say that the
higher θ is the higher the tax rate that maximizes individual i’s utility must
be.
W ec a nt h e nw r i t e :
15Proposition 2 The less capitalist and individual is the higher will be is pre-
ferred tax rate.
Proposition 3 The lower the government saving rate (1 − θ) is the higher
will be individual’s i preferred tax rate.
This last proposition tell us that individuals will try and correct the sub-
investment in public capital by demanding an higher tax rate.
4.2 Optimal θ











From equation (70) we can easily conclude that θ
i is an increasing function
of σi and of τi.We can state that:
Proposition 4 The less capitalistic individual i is the lower will is preferred
government saving rate be.
Proposition 5 The lower the tax rate is the lower will the government sav-
ing rate (1 − θ) be.
5 Policy Choice under Majority Voting
Lets remember the following concepts 10:
Deﬁnition 1: A Condorcet Winner is a policy choice that beats any
other feasible policy in a pair wise vote
10See [28]
16Proposition 6 If all voters have singled peaked policy preferences over a
given ordering of policy alternatives, a Condorcet winner always exists and
coincides with the median-ranked bliss point.
The median-voter theorem can be applied in this case if we assume that
consumers will only vote one thing at a time (τ or θ). When individuals look
at their maximization problem they clearly see that τ aﬀects their income and
hence will interfere in the choices made but they don’t have a clear perception
of the eﬀect of θ. θ is a variable on the government side and it is not explicit
in any function from the consumer’s view point. Unless the consumer knows
precisely how the government works he will not understand the eﬀect of θ. It
seems more reasonable to have voters choosing the tax rate rather than the
government saving rate. So we will assume that individuals will vote only
over τ. With this assumption we have that voting takes place over a single
issue, preferences are singled peaked and there exists a monotonic relation
between ideal policies (whether is τ or is θ) and individual endowments.
Moreover under (24) we assure that optimal policies and factor endow-
ments are constant over time and so it does not matter the moment in time
where voting takes place.
Under these conditions the median-voter theorem assures us that we have
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=( α + β)ρ (71)
Where the index m indicates that we are talking about the median voter.
We can look at this expression as the reaction function for the median voter,
i.e., when individual m knows θ he will react and choose the tax rate that
maximizes is utility.
Now in a perfectly egalitarian society σi =1∀i because everybody would
have the same percentage of private capital. In the real world we have σm > 1
17since most voters have relatively more labor11 than private capital. Concern-
ing factor ownership, the greater the gap between σm and 1 the more unequal
the society is.












t represents unskilled labor then everybody has basically the same
amount of L, which means that individual income will be decreasing on
factor endowment. The less capitalistic an individual is the lower will his
income be.
We have already seen that the greater the gap between σm and 1 the more
unequal the society is in what factor ownership is concerned and we know
now that this implies:
Proposition 7 The greater the gap between σm a n d1t h em o r eu n e q u a lt h e
society is in terms of income distribution12.
We can also easily conclude that the greater the gap between σm and 1
the further τm (the actual choice of policy) will be from τ∗ and hence the
lower the growth rate will be. We can state that:
Proposition 8 The more unequal the society is in, what income distribution
i sc o n c e r n e d ,t h el o w e rt h eg r o w t hr a t ew i l lb e .
Can the government interfere in the choice of τ by changing its saving
rate, i.e., if the government changes the level of θ (1-saving rate) will the
distance between the actual chosen τ and the optimal one be smaller?
We know that if θ decreases the tax rate that maximizes the growth rate
will also decrease and the tax rate that maximizes the utility of individual i
(in our case i = m) will also decrease. If the eﬀect is stronger on τm than on
τ∗ we could conclude the following:
11We are talking about unskilled labor. This model does not consider human capital.
12Remember that 1 is the average factor endowment and that the distance between the
average and median gives us a measure of inequality.
18Proposition 9 By increasing its own saving rate, the government can im-
prove the economy’s performance by approximating the growth rate to its
optimal level.
T h ep r o o fc a nb es e e ni nA p p e n d i xE
We can show that the more unequal income distribution is the more apart
will τm be from τ∗ and the stronger the impact on the distance between the
actual growth rate and the optimal growth rate will a change in θ produce
(since the higher this tax is, so is the variation of τi).
Comparing our results with the one obtained in [1] we can see that in
this paper the authors consider the maximum distortion, i.e., they consider
θ =1 .
From this result we could expect governments to chose θ ≈ 0. The reason
why this doesn’t happen is that a decrease in θ will have a negative eﬀect on
the balanced growth path growth rate (52a). What we have is a situation
where governments should have to ﬁnd a θ that guarantees they achieve their
goal of maximizing the growth rate. There will be situations where increasing
θ will be beneﬁcial (in terms of the growth rate) and others where it will not.
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we will try to see how the parameters of the model aﬀect the
positive relation between τ and θ.
To calibrate the model we used the following values for the parameters:
A αβ π ρσ
10 . 3 60 . 1 50 . 4 7 7 80 . 0 21 . 1
The values for A, α and ρ where taken from [10]. In [22] The authors
suggest that the weight of the public sector in the production function should
be somewhere around 0.31 but in [23] they correct this estimate and show
evidence that this value should not be larger than 0.15. Knowing α and β,
19the value of ψ was taken from (37). To evaluate π we used the data from [16]
and worked with the median public capital and the median private capital.
Finally we had to come up with a plausible value for σ. We had data on
wages and salaries and on income from property13 from 1970 till 2000. We
subtracted these two series to the GDP and considered that everything else
was capital income. We then calculated the ratio of wages and salaries to
capital income and the median value was 1.100124.
The ﬁrst thing we were able to conﬁrm is that equation (C22) postulates
a positive relation between τ on θ. In Figure 3 this relation becomes obvious.
Figure 3
We then, tried to see how did this relation react to changes in β.L e t s
ﬁrst recall that β gives us the weight of the public sector in the production
function. In ﬁgure F2 we have equation (C22) ploted three times: the black
line correspondes to β =0 .1, the red line to β =0 .15 and the yellow line to
13OECD database
20β =0 .214. What we can see is that if the relevance of public inputs increases
voters will have a bigger need to correct the public ”sub-investment”. Given
θ increases in β will lead to higer tax rates.
Figure 4
In Figure 5 we were interested in seeing how the relation between the
tax rate and public savings was aﬀe c t e db yt h el e v eo fi n c o m ei n e q u a l i t i e s .
Once again we ploted the same relation considering three diﬀerent values of
σ (blue σ =0 .1, red σ =1 .1 and green σ = 3). It is easy to see that as
societies become more even concerning income distribution there will be a
smaller need to correct government choices. With σ closer to 0 (closer to
a pure capitalist) the choice of τ will be closer to the optimum and hence
smaller than what should be expected in a society with σ far from 1 (far from
the average).
14Changes in β will necessarily reﬂect in changes in π we will have:
β 0.1 0.15 0.2
π 0.4431 0.4778 05153
21Figure 5
At last we can see how the reaction function of individual i is afected by
t h et i m ed i s c o u n tr a t e . L o o k i n ga tF igure 6 we can see that as the future
becomes more important (blue ρ =0 .009, red ρ =0 .02 and green ρ =0 .1)
voters will be more willing to pay taxes in order to correct the distortion
towards public consumption.
Figure 6
226C o n c l u s i o n
We have introduced a model similar to the one presented in [26] and we
added the households side of the problem.
Consumers maximize their utility and they distinguish themselves by the
relative factor endowment (labor and private capital). σi is the relative
factor endowment (labor/capital) for individual i and the higher it is the
more capital poor individual i is. If σi is zero then the individual i is a pure
capitalist (he doesn’t have any labor income).
Solving the decentralized problem we found the economy’s growth rate.
This growth rate has an inverted U-shape relationship with the tax rate
(which is consistent with the ﬁndings of [6] and of [1]). The tax rate that
maximizes the growth rate (τ∗) is constant over time and depends on the
parameters of the model and also on the government saving rate.
Individual i has one and only one tax rate that maximizes its own utility.
The more capital poor an individual i is the higher will is preferred tax rate
be and hence the furthest apart from τ∗.
In what the policy choice is concerned (individuals have to choose the tax
rate taking the government saving rate as given) we have proven that we have
a Condorcet winner and it will be the tax rate that maximizes the utility of
the median voter. Being this the case we have also established that the more
unequal a society is, in what income distribution is concerned, the further
away will the chosen tax rate be form τ∗ and hence the lower will the growth
rate be. This results are similar to do ones obtained by [1], however we
introduced government expenditures composition as a device for interfering
in the choice of τ. This new instrument allows the government to interfere
in the relation between τ∗ and τm. Because voters are aware of the excessive
amount of public consumption they will prefer to be more taxed in order
to correct the sub-investment on the government side. We have concluded
that the positive relation between θ and τ is sensitive to the parameters of
the model. More weight of the public sector on the production function, a
more uneven society (in what income distribution is concerned) and a larger
discount rate will lead to larger tax rates (taken the public saving rate as
given).
23The possibility of a deciding government that manipulates it’s saving rate
(1-θ)a l l o w sf o ral e s sh a r m f u le ﬀect of income inequality on the economy’s
performance namely on its growth rate. However this increase can also be
harmful to the growth rate once it depends positively on θ. There is some
trade-oﬀ t h a tc a nb ee x p l o r e di nt h es e n s eo fa c h i e v i n ga no p t i m a ll e v e lo f
public consumption or investment.
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27Appendix A - Relation Between Income Inequality and Govern-
ment Eﬃciency
Government Quality and Income Inequality
Government Expenditures and Income Inequality































































































29Appendix C - Optimal Tax Rate for Individual i
























































































































































































































































































































































gt Li + γτ (α + β)
w(τ,θ)
wτ(τ,θ)






gt = π (C14)
We know that:
γ = Aα(θτ)
β π − τ − ρ (C15)
γτ = Aαβ (θτ)
β πτ
−1 − 1 (C16)
w(τ,θ)=A(1 − α)(θτ)
β (C17)
wτ = A(1 − α)β (θτ)
β τ
−1 (C18)
Going back to (C13) and replacing we have:
³
Aαβ (θτ)





























β π − τ
´
ρ




β π − τ
´ α + β
β
+
32+(1− α − β)
³
Aα(θτ)
β π − τ
´










1−β¢ α + β
β
+






















´ α + β
β
+








=( α + β)ρ (C22)
33Appendix D - Optimal Theta for individual i
Looking again to the ﬁrst order conditions of the centralized problem,



















From (D1) we obtain:












μ2]( D 3 )























kpt + w(θ,τ)(α + β)πLi
ci e−ρtwθ(θ,τ)πLi
γθci





kpt + w(θ,τ)(α + β)πLi
wθ (θ,τ)πLi − (α + β)γ = −ρ − γ ⇔ (73)
γθ
ρ
wθ (θ,τ)πLi + γθ
w(θ,τ)(α + β)
wθ (θ,τ)
+( 1− α − β)γ = −ρ (74)
Recalling that:
34γ = Aα(θτ)
β π − τ − ρ (D6)





wθ = A(1 − α)β (θτ)
β θ
−1 (D9)











35A p p e n d i xE-P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9
Proof. Lets recall equation (C22) and lets diﬀerentiate this equation in










− β (α + β)Aα
βθ
β−1 −




β−1π +( 1− α − β)
∂τ
∂θ





















− β(α + β)Aαπθ
βτ







β+1σi − β (α + β)Aπατ
βθ








Aπ(1−α)θβ+1σi + β (α + β)Aπατβθ





β − β(α + β)Aαπθ
βτβ−1 +1− α − β − (1 − α − β)Aαπβθ
βτβ−1
(E3)













β +1− α − β − kβ−1 (E4)
Taking yet another derivative (and calling N to the numerator of the





(1 − β)k−β αβρ






D − (β − 1)kβ−2N
D2
(E5)











D +( 1− β)k
β−2N>0
(E6)
We conclude that: ∂τ
∂θ∂k > 0. This means that the higher k is, i.e., the
further apart we are from τ∗ the eﬀect of a change in θ in τ will be stronger.
So if we diminish θ we will be diminishing the distance between τ∗ and τi
15(notice that N is positive and D has to be positive once we have already establish that
∂τ
∂θ > 0)
37